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[L. A. No. 19502. In Bank. Jan. 91,1947.) 
G. E. SATTERLEE, Respondent, v. ORANGE GLENN 
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY et at, 
Appellants. 
[1] Negligence-Exercise of Oare.-While the standard of care to 
which one must conform is usually that of the ordinarily 
prudent or reasonable person under like eircumstanees, the 
proper conduct of a reasonable person under particmlar situa-
tions may become settled by judicial decision or be prescribed 
by statute or ordinanee. 
MeX. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, 122; [2, 8] Negligence, 
190; [4] Negligence, 191; [5] Negligence, § 150; [6] Negligence, 
§ 92; [7] Negligence, § 93; [8] Automobiles, 186; {9] Automobiles, 
I S28; {lO] Automobiles, 1 843-40. 
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(2] Id.-Violation of Statute or OrdiDance.-An act or failure to 
act below a statutory standard is negligence per ", or negli-
gence as a matter of law. 
[3] Id. - Violation of Satute or Ordinance.-Where the evidence 
in a personal injury case establishes that plaintiff's or de-
fendant's violation of a statute or ordinance proximately 
eaused the injury and no excuse or justification for violation 
is shown by the evidence, responsibility may be fixed on the 
violator without other proof of failure to use due eare. 
[4] Id.-Violation of Statute or Ordinance-Rebuttal of Presump-
tion.-The presumption of negligence arising from perform-
ance of an act in violation of a statute or ordinance is not 
conclusive, but may be rebutted by showing that the act was 
justifiable or excusable under the circumstances. 
[6] Id.-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether or not a violation 
of a statute or ordinance proximately contributed to an acci-
dent and whether the violation was excusable or justifiable are 
questions of fact except in a ease where the court is impelled 
to say that from the facts reasonable men can draw only the 
inference that the negligence of .the violator contributed to 
the accident. 
[8] Id.-Violation of St&tute or Ordinance-Persons Intended to 
Be Bene1lted.-A violation of a statute is actionable negli-
gence only as to the persons to whom a duty is owed. 
[?] Id.-Violation of St&tute or Ordinance--Oausal Oonnection.-
In a negligence action predicated on the violation of a statute, 
it is necessary to show that the violation was a proximately 
contributing cause of the injury. 
[8] Automobiles-Oonduct of Operator-Oare at Intersections-
Bight of Way.-An operator of a motor vehicle which haa 
entered an intersection prior to or at the same time as an-
other vehicle eannot arbitrarily rely on the right of way gained 
as a result of excessive speed or by other negligent act or 
violation of law. 
[9] Id.-Instructions-Oare of Operator-Oonduct at Intersections 
-Bight of Way.-In an action for injuries arising out of a 
collision of plaintiff's automobile with defendant's school bus 
at an intersection, it was not error to refuse an instruction 
that plaintiff's violation of the Vehicle Code provisions relat-
ing to rights of way at intersections constituted negligence, 
[2] Bee 19 OaLJur. 632; 38 Am.Jur. 827. 
[8] Right of way at street or highway intersections as de-
pendent on, or independent of, care or negligence, notes, 89 A.L.B. 
838; ~ ,6..L.&.1~7. See, also, 2 OalJ'ur. lO-Yr. SUJilP. sao. 
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where such instruction did not tender the issue whether the 
circumstances were such as to excuse violation, there being 
evidence that the bus had increased its speed before reaching 
the intersection, and also that the driver did not observe the 
automobile until almost the instant of the impact. 
[10] Id. - Instructions - Oontributory Negligence - Intersection 
CollisioD.-ln an action for injuries arising out of a collision 
of plaintiff's automobile with defendant'. school bus at an 
intersection, it was error and a miscarriage of justice to give 
an instruction which in effect told the jury that defendant 
had the burden of establishing plaintiff's failure to act as a 
reasonable man under the circumstances although he had vio-
lated a statute and such violation proximately caused the 
action, since the presumption created by proof of the failure 
to comply with the statute relieved defendant of the burden 
of proof in this respect. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County. Edward J. Kelly, Judge. Reversed. 
Husband's action for damages for injuries and for death of 
his wife resulting from an automobile collision. Judgment for 
plaintiff reversed. 
Tripp, Callaway, Sampson & Dryden, Lowell L. Dryden 
and DeWitt W. Manning for Appellants. 
William M. Hawkes, Monroe & McInnis and C. M. Monroe 
for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-G. E. Satterlee sued to recover damages 
for the death of his wife, and also for injury to his person and 
property resulting from an automobile collision. The principal 
points relied upon as grounds for a reversal of the judgment in 
his favor concern two jury instructions stating the legal effect 
of violation of the Vehicle Code in fixing liability for the 
accident. 
At the time the accident occurred, Satterlee, accompanied 
by his wife, was driving an automobile in a northerly direc-
tion on Citrus Drive. A bus of the school district, operated 
by Paul Osteraas, was traveling west on Bear Valley Road to-
ward its intersection with Citrus Drive. From a point about 
60 feet south of Bear Valley Road, for several hundred feet 
to the south, Citrus Drive had a six per cent ascending grade. 
) 
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Bear Valley Road was about level on both sides of Citrus 
Drive and the streets intersected at approximately a 90 de-
gree angle. Neither of these roads was a through highway, 
although Citrus Drive carried considerably more traffic than I 
the east and west street. The hard surfaced portion of Bear 
Valley Road together with its shoulders, was approximately 
29 feet wide; that of Citrus Drive was 32 feet. 
As the two drivers approached the corner at about 8 o'clock 
in the morning, both of them had a clear and unobstructed 
view of the intersecting road for about 600 feet in each direc-
tion. The weather was overcast with a drizzling mist, but this 
did not affect visibility. Their testimony was in direct con-
flict as to who first entered the intersection, the relative speeds 
at which the vehicles were traveling, and the distance of the 
vehicles from the intersection when each operator first ob-
served the other. 
Satterlee declared that he was driving at a speed of about 
25 miles per hour, and when he was some 75 to 100 feet south 
of the intersection he first saw the school bus approaching 
from his right. The bus then appeared to be about twice as 
far from the intersection. Satterlee continued on at the "same 
rate of speed." He said that he thought he had "worlds of 
time," that he did not see the bus again until just before the 
impact, and that he believed he was in the intersection first 
"because I was so far across." 
Osteraas estimated that prior to reaching Citrus Drive, I 
the speed of the bus was between 30 and 35 miles per hour : 
when, at a point about 195 feet east of the intersection, he : 
looked to his left and saw the Satterlee automobile. It wa..'l ' 
then some 300 feet south of the intersection traveling north 
at a speed of between 35 and 45 miles per hour. He realized i 
that if neither vehiclp slackened its speed the two would reach i 
the intersection at approximately the same time, but he ex-
pected Satterlee to slow down. He did not see the automobile 
again until it was too late to avoid the collision. However, 
he was positive that the bus entered the intersection first, . 
traveling at a speed of about 20 to 25 miles per hour. 
The testimony of four disinterested witnesses casts consid-
erable doubt upon the bus driver's account of the accident. 
They quoted Osteraas as saying that he did not see the Sat-. 
terleevehicle until just before the collision; also, that he did 
not know how the accident happened as the first thing he 
knew, the car was in front of him and he did not have time 
) 
) 
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to stop. According to the evidence, these statements. and other 
remarks by Osteraas of like import, were made within an hour 
after the accident. 
The point of impact, as estimated by the investigating of. 
ficer, was approximately one and one-half feet north of the 
center line of Bear Valley Road and five feet east of the center 
line of Citrus Drive. Brake marks left by the school bus led 
up to the point of impact. The marks on the road indicated 
that the bus had swerved to the right "after the point of 
impact." The left front corner of the bus struck the right 
side of the automobile either over the right fTont wheel or 
oposite the rip:ht front door. 
An instruction requested by the appellants and refused by 
the trial court read as follows: 
"You are instrncted under Section 550 of the Vehicle 
Code. which is the law of the State of Calitornia, provides 
as follows: 
"Vehicle Approaching or Entering Intersectitm. 
"(a) The driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection 
shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered 
the intersf'ction from 8 different highway . 
.. (b) When two vehicles enter an intersection from dif-
ferent hi!!'hways at the same time the drivel' of the vehicle 
on the left shall yield the right of way to the drivel' of the 
vehicle on the ri~ht . 
.. (c) This section shan not apply to vehicles approaching 
each other from opposite directions, when the driver of one 
of such vehicles is intending to or is makinv. a left turn. Such 
movements sha]] be governeo by Section 551. 
"I therefore instruct you that if you find under the evi-
dence that the school bUR operated by Paul Osteraas entered· 
the intersection before the vehicle operated by the plaintiff, i 
then I instruct you that it was the duty of the plaintiff. to . 
yield the right of way to the school bus, and a failure so to . 
do would constitut.e negli~ence on the part of G. E. Satterlee. 
"In accordance with the provisions of this section just 
rend to you, I further instruct you that if you find under the 
evidence that the school bus and the Satterlee vehicle entered . 
the intersection from different highways at the same time, . 
and if you further find that the school bus was to the right 
of the Satterlee automobile, then I instruct you thnt it was 
the duty of the plaintiff to yield the right of way to the school 
bus and a failure so to do would constitute negligence. 
) 
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fry OU are' therefore instructed that if you And under the 
''i 
evidenoo that the plaintiff violated the provisions of the Vehicle 
Code, sueh violation is negligenoo, and if you further find 
that such negligenoo if any proximately eontributed in the ' 
slightest degree to the subsequent accident and injury, then 
your verdiet must be in favor of the defendant, Orange Glen 
School Distriet of San Diego County and against the plain-'; 
tiff, G. E. Satterlee."::~ 
Upon his own motion the trial judge instrueted the jury: 
"Now, with referenoo to this matter of right of way. I wish f 
to teD you members of the jury that one may have the right ,". 
of way and yet be negligent. One caDnot rely on the riJ?;ht, 
of way arbitrarily and foroo anyone else oft the highway. He ~ 
cannot barge in and claim the right of way over one whose .' 
approach may be a menace to his safety or to the driver of 
that automobile's safety. The same test which I have given 
you originally applies in eases on intersections of highways, 
regardless of who was in the intersection first, and ~rdlesR 
of whieh automobile is on the right, if they approaehed at the 
same time; that is. what would a reasonably prudent person 
have done under the same or similar circumstances. That ap- -, 
plies to both the drivers eo11iding. whether thfJY approach 
the intersection at the same time. enter it at the same time, 
or one entered the intersection tirst. In other words. these 
rules of law are not absolute. They must be considered in 
eonnection with what would a reasonably prudent person 
have done under the same or similar circumstances • . • 
"1 have told you substantially of the rules of law and 
gave you what is called the basic speed law. I told you that 
when two automobiles enter an intersection at the same time 
the automobile or motor vehicle, whether bus or lighter vehicle, 
on the right. has the right of way. and if one motor vehicle 
enters an intersection before the other, that motor vehicle 
has the right of way, but that the right of way is not an ab-
solute riJ?;ht to barge through ignoring any danger to the 
other motorist or to the barging motorist. One cannot arbi-
trarily rely on the right of way and expect to seatter from 
his path all of those who have lesser rights. In other words. 
the same genera) rule applies. and the test is: What would 
a reasonably prudent person do under the same or similar 
circumstances' It is possible for one who has the right of 
way to be neglilrent in the operation of that unquestioned 
right, under a cel'tain set of circumstances." 
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The appellants contend that in view of their defense of 
contributory negligence based upon an asserted violation of 
section 550 of the Vehicle Code, they were entitled to an un-
equivocal instruction in the form requested by them. The 
facts of this case, they insist, do not bring it within the rule 
that circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control may excuse 
violation of the statute. The court's instruction to the effect 
that violation of the statute was of no consequence if the 
plaintiff acted as a reasonably prudent person would act un-
der similar circumstances is also chalJenged as erroneous. 
Theevidenee was evenly balanced upon the issues of n~g­
ligence and contributory negligence, say the appelJants. and 
as it would support a finding that the bus entered the inter-
section first, the failure to correctly instruct the jury as to all 
of the material issues constituted reversible error. 
The position of the respondent is that the proposed instruc-
tion gives no regard to the circumstances surrounding the 
accident, such as the speed at which the two vehicles ap-
proached the intersection, the attention given by each driver 
to other traffic, and the respective manner in which the auto-
mobile and the bus were operated. Also, the requested in-
struction does not include as a basis for the jury's con-
sideration circumstances which might properly be considered 
as excusing violation of the statute. In conclusion, says the 
respondent, the instructioIlR given fully and adequately cov-
ered the law applicable to the case. 
[1] The standard of care to which ordinarily one must 
conform is usually that of the ordinarily prudent or rea-
sonable person under like circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 1714; 
James v. Frazee, 209 Cal. 456 [288 P. 784] ; Kelley v. Hodge 
Transp. System, 197 Cal. 598 r242 P. 76] ; Scott v. San Ber-
nardino Valley etc. Co., 152 Cal. 604 (93 P. 677] ; Franklin v. 
Southern Oal. Motor Road Co., 85 Cal. 63 r24 P. 723] : Rich-
ardson v. Kier, 34 Cal. 63 [91 Am.Dec. 681] ; F'l,l.Ch v. Werner, 
99 Cal.App. 557 [279 P. 183]; Ohalmers v. Hawkins, 78 Cal. 
App. 733 (248 P. 727] ; Rest., Torts, § 283.) But the proper 
conduct of a reasonable person under particular situations 
may become settled by judicial decision or be prescn"bed by 
statute or ordinance. 
Traffic rules are statutory standards; for example, a park-
ing requirement (Thompson v. Bayless, 24 Cal.2d 543 [150 P. 
2d 413]); direction of traffic on the street (Harris v. John-
) 
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,on, 174 Cal. 55 [161 P. 1155, Ann.Cas. 1918E 560, L.R.A. 
1917C 477]); limitation upon speed (B'tl.jamin v. NOOf&(Jn, 
207 Cal. 279 [277 P. 1045]); Schming v. C'tl.tral Cal. Trac-
tion Co., 115 Cal.App. 30 r1 P.2d 53]); but section 513 of 
the Vehicle Code now makes it necessary to establish as a 
fact that the operation of 8 vehicle at a greater than pre-
scribed speed constitutes negligence. [I] An aet or fanure to 
act below the statutory standard is negligence per .e, or neg· 
ligence as a matter of law. [8] And if the evidence establishes 
that the plaintiff's or defendant's violation of the statute or 
ordinance proximately caused the injury and no excuse or i 
justification for violation is shown by the evidence, responsi. 
bility may be fixed upon the violator without other proof 
of failure to exercise due care. (Thompson v. Bayless,8'Upra; 
Wright v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 14 CaUd 168 {93 P.U 
135] ; Stein v. Uflited Railroads, 159 Cal. 368 r113 J. 6631; 
Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co .. 154 Cal. 663 f98 P. 1063, 
16 Ann. Cas. 1061]: McKune v. Santn Clara V. M. c.t L. Co., 
110 Cal. 480 (42 P. 9801: Siemers v. Eisen. 54 Cal. 418; Muir i 
v. Cheney Bros., 64 Cal.App.2d 55 {US P.2d 138) ; Samuelson . 
v. Siefer, 62 Cal.App.2d 320 f144 P.2d 879]; li'er(fU$on v. 
Nakahara, 43 Ca1.App.2d 435 r110 P.2d 1091]; Alechoff v. 
Los Angeles O. & E. Corp., 84 Ca1.Anp. 33 (257 P. 569] ; Con. 
nell v. Harris, 23 Ca1.App. 537 £138 P. 9441; see: Rest., Torts, 
§§ 285, 286, 288.) 
[4] However, in an emergency, or under unusual eon-
ditions, it is generally held that circumstances may be shown 
to excuse the violation. The rule has been aptly stated in 
JoUey v. Clemem, 28 Cal.App.2d 55, 67 £82 P.2d 51], where 
it was said (quoting from 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negli-
gence, § 13): "c ... violation of such a statute or ordinance 
is presumptive evidence of negligence, which, if not excused 
by other evidence, including all the surrounding circum-
stances, should be deemed conclusive . . .''' Continuing, the 
court said: "But unless and until justification or excuse for 
sucb conduct appear ... the general rule applies and it must 
be treated as negligence per 36." To the same effect if! Oal-
lichotte v. California Mut. etc. Assn., 4 Cal.App.2d 503, 505 
[41 P.2d 349], where it was stated: "Violation of an ordi-
nance is negligence per 36. In Alechof/ v. Los Angeles Oa.<r c.t 
Electric Corp., 84 Cal.App. 33, 39 [257 P. 569], it is said: 
'It is an axiomatic truth, that every person while violating an 
express statute, is a wrongdoer, and as such is '3; necessitate 
) 
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negligent in the eye of the law.' An act which fa performec1 
in violation of an ordinance or statute is presumptively an act 
of negligence, but the presumption is not eonclusive and may 
be rebutted by showing that the act was justi1lable or excus-
able under the eireumstances. Until 80 rebutted it is eon-
clusive. (Mora v. PotlillG, 186 Cal. 199, 202 [199 P. 17]; 
Bath v. Batl.1C8fon, 101 Cal.App. 274, 281 [281 P. 1081].)" 
However, the fact which will exeuse the violation of a statute 
has been defined by the eourt as one resnltin~ "from eauses 
or things beyond the eontrol of the person ehargOO with the 
violation." (4 Cal.App.2d at p. 506. See also: TAompson v. 
Bayless. supra; Mather, v. County of Ritlerride, 22 Oal.2d 
781 [141 P.2d 419] ; PenneSley v. Pacific 9tJa ct Elec. Co., 20 
CaUd 141 [124 P.2d 51]; Johnson v. Griffith, 19 Cal.2d 176 
[120 P.2d 6]; BerkOtlite v. AmerictJn Bitler GrGtlel Co., 191 
Cal. 195 [215 P. 675]; 8quier v. Dow Std. Bread Co., 181 
Cal. 533 [185 P. 391] ; Cragg v. Lo, Angelu Tnuf Co., supra; 
Shelby v. 80uthern Poc. Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 594 [157 P.2d 
442]; Robert. v. Salmon, 66 Cal.App.2d 22 [151 P.2d 556]; 
Piet, v. Hubbard, 59 Cal.App.2d 124 (138 P.2d 815]; Pru-
cott v. City of OrGnge. 56 Oa1.App.2d 144 [132 P.2d 523]; 
Pinney v. Wierman, 52 Oal.App.2d 282 [126 P.2d 143]; 
Henslee v. Po%,25 Oal.App.2d 286 [77P.2d 307]; Scolf v. 
Bieler, 11 Cal.App.2d 44 [53 P.2d 868]; Hill v. Peru, 136 
Cal.App. 144 (28 P.2d 944]; PrBittJS v. PtJlsmno, 181 Cal. 
App. 585 [21 P.2d 993]; Giorgeffi v. WolltJSton, 83 Cal.App. 
858 [257 P. 109].) 
Thus in Both v. Bankston, supra, where an automobile was 
parked partly on the highway in violation of the statute, the 
defendant was allowed to show that, despite reasonably eareful 
inspeetion, the gasoline supply became exhausted and the ear 
stalled. In another ease where a eollision oeeurred with a ear 
which had no taillight, evidence that the light was inspected 
and found in good order a short time before was held ad-
missible to negative the presumption of negligence. (Berko-
tlitlt v. AmerictJn Gratlel Co., supro.) And in Mather, v. 
County of Ritleraide, supra, this court reversed a judgment 
which followed an instruetion to the jury that if the plaintiit 
violated section 525 of the Vehicle Code which requires driv-
ing as close as praetieable to the right side edge of the road, 
she was negligent as a matter of law. "Under all of the 
cirCUmstances of the ease," said the court, Uit should have 
been left to the jury whether or not the position of her ~r 
. , 
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with reference to the white line constituted contnoutory 
negligence!' (P. 786.) 
A dUferent conclusion was reached where defendant stopped 
on the roadway side of a parked car to pennit his wife to 
alight. The car behind, in which plainti1! was riding, col-
lided with defendant's vehicle. Defendant's excuse for viola-
tion of the prohibition against double parking (Veh. Code 
§ 586) was not accepted, the court holding that the positive 
mandate of the statute could not be set aside for personal 
convenience. (Mason v. Orawford, 17 Oal.App.2d 529 [62 
P.2d 420].) 
[5] In the application of this rule each violation of a 
statutory requirement must be considered in connection with 
the surrounding circumstances. Ordinarily, the excuse relied 
upon by the violator presents a question of fact for the jury's 
determination. As stated in Scalf v. Eicker, avpt'a, p. 54: 
"Whether or not a violation of a statute or ordinance proxi-
mately contributed to an accident and whether the violation 
was excusable or justifiable are questions of fact except in a 
case where ' ••• the court is impelled to say that from the 
facts reasonable men can draw but one inference and that 
an inference pointing unerringly to the negligence of the 
plaintUf contributing to his injury.'" (See also: Matker, v. 
Oounty of Riverside, .supra; Johnson v. Griffith, avpra; Arez" 
lano v. City of Burbank, 13 Oal.2d 248 [89 P.2d 113] ; Berko-
tJit~ v. American River GraveZ 00., avpra; Prescott v. Oity 
of Orange, mpra; Eberl v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil 00.,54 Cal. 
App.2d 497 [129 P.2d 135]; Wright v. Ponitz,44 Cal.App.2d 
215 [112 P.2d 25]; Mecchi v. Lyon Van &; Storage 00., 38 
Cal.App.2d 674 [102 P.2d 422] ; Osgood v. Oity of San Diego, 
17 Cal.App.2d 345 [62 P.2d 195].) 
[6] But there is, of course, a further question in connec-
tion with the issue of negligence. Although a violation of a 
statute is not excusable under the particular circumstances of 
the case, liability is also dependent upon proof that a duty 
was owed to persons in the class of the plainti1! or the defend-
ant who is relying upon contributory negligence. (Bateman 
v. Doughnu.t Oorp. of America, 63 Oal.App.2d 711 [147 P.2d 
404] ; Figone v. Guisti, 43 Cal.App.606 [185 P. 694] ; Oorbett 
v. Spanos, 37 Cal.App. 200 [173 P. 769]; see: Flynn v. 
Bledsoe Co., 92 Ca1.App. 145 [267 P. 887]; Rest., Torts, § 286.) 
[7] It is also necessary to show that the violation was a 
proximatelT. eontributms cause of the in,iur,y. ,(BwiI ,. 
') 
~/ 
. , 
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Bcm1c of CaUfomio., 211 Cal. 548 [296 P. 68); 'Williams v. 
Sovlhe,.. PtIC. Co., 173 Cal. 525 [160 P. 660]; Hitstm v. 
Dw1/er,61 Cal.App.2d 803 [143 P.2d 952); SMric1c v. Gallo-
VJGf/, 19 Cal.App.2d 693 [66 P.2d 185].) 
[8] In the present ease the requested instruction advised 
the jury that if the school bus entered the intersection before 
the vehicle operated by Satterlee, his failure to yield the right 
of way constituted negligence; if the two vehicles entered the 
intersection at the same time, and the school bus was to the 
right of the Satterlee vehicle, his failure to yield the right 
of way constituted negligence; and if Satterlee'. violation 
of these Vehicle Code sections proximately contributed in the 
slightest degree to the happening of the accident, the verdict 
must be in favor of the school district and its driver. But 
an operator of a motor vehicle cannot arbitrarily rely upon 
the right of way gained as a result of excessive speed or by 
other negligent act or violation of the Jaw. (Limlenbaum v. 
BtJrbour, 213 Cal. 277 [2 P.2d 161]; StetlefUtm v. I'Uming, 
4:7 CalApp.2d 225 [117 P.2d 717]; Miller v. OrofUttm, 41 
Cal.App.2d 470 [106 P.2d 963]; Groat v. WtJlkup Df'G1Jage 
•• Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 350 [58 P.2d 200]; see: PtJ(Je v. MtJeUi, 
213 Cal. 644 [3 P.2d 11); CtlSBelman v. Harlforvl A. .1. Co., 
86 Cal.App.2d 700 [98 P.2d 539] ; PtJttWtm v. C(JtIa'I&tJgh, 18 
CalApp.2d 123 [63 P.2d 868,64 P.2d 945]; 136 A..L.R. 1497 
supplementing annotation in 89 A..L.R. 838.) [9] And al-
though the instruction correctly left the question of fact of 
violation to the jury, it invaded the province of the trier of 
fact by not tendering for consideration the issue as to whether 
the circumstances were such as to excuse violation. From the 
evidence, the jury reasonably might have found that the bus 
increased· its speed while traveling the 200 feet immediately 
east of the point of impact. If, as stated by Satterlee, when 
he observed the bus it was about twice as far from the inter-
section and traveling at approximately the same speed as his 
own vehicle, then he reasonably was justified, the jury could 
have concluded, in assuming that the bus would not danger-
ously increase its speed in order to enter the intersection first. 
Certainly by his own act of increasing speed or "racing for 
the intersection" an automobile driver should not be allowed 
to charge the operator of the other vehicle in the collision 
with negligence per 18 without the right to prove ~usti1ication 
for the ltatutoq violltim: 
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Furthermore, the testimony of distinterested witnesses shows 
that the bus driver, having unimpaired visibility, did not ob-
serve the automobile until almost the instant of impact. Under 
these circumstances it was a question of fact whether Satter-
lee's violation of the code provisions, if any, was justifiable or 
excusable. And although judicial discretion may be exercised 
in the adoption of a standard of care for the purpose of im-
posing civil liability, the refused instruction did not a1Iord the 
jury an opportunity to pass upon the question as to whether 
the circumstances shown by the evidence a1Iorded excuse or 
justification. For these reasons, to have instructed the jury 
in the terms proposed by the appellants would have consti-
tuted prejudicial error. (See Mathers v. County of Riverside, 
81I.pra; Pietz v. Hubbard, 81I.pra; Pinney v. Wierman, 81I.pra; 
Marston v. Pickwick 8tages, Inc., 78 Cal.App. 526 [248 P. 
930] ; Hagenah v. Bidwell, 46 Cal.App. 556 [189 P. 7991.) 
[10] The instruction given by the trial judge upon his own 
motion presents a more diflicult question. He refused to adopt 
the standard of care established by the Legislature and did 
not instruct the jury that violation of the statutory standard 
constituted prima facie evidence of negligence which could 
be rebutted by evidence of justification or excuse. Instead, 
upon the issue of contributory negligence, the court adopted 
the reasonable man standard of care exclusively, and allowed 
the jury to determine what constituted due care under the 
circumstances. The question presented for decision upon this 
aspect of the case is, therefore, whether the trial court arrived 
at a proper standard. 
By the instruction which adopted the reasonable man 
standard of care, the jury, in e1rect, was told that the school 
district and its driver had the burden of etsablishing the 
failure of Satterlee to act as a reasonable man under the cir-
cumstances although he had violated a statute and such viola-
tion proximately caused the accident. That is not the law. 
The presumption created by proof of the failure to comply 
with a statute or ordinance relieves a defendant from the 
burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to act as a reason-
ably prudent man. All that the defendant need prove to 
establish contributory negligence is that plaintiff's violation of 
the statute in question proximately caused the accident. There-
fore the burden cast upon the defendant where such viola-
tion is relied upon, is more easily established than a failure to 
act as would a reasonably prudent man under aimilar circum-
. , 
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. stances. If there was a violation of the applicable statute, the 
burden of going forward is then cast upon the plaintiff, if the 
defendant is relying upon contributory negligence, to present 
evidence justifying an excuse for violation. If the jury does 
not believe that the evidence is sufficient to excuse violation, 
it must find for the defendant. 
For these reasons the adoption by the trial court of the 
standard of care imposed by a statute or ordinance becomes an 
important factor in imposing liability. The instruction given 
by the court on its own motion had the effect of minimizing, if 
not completely negativing, the code provision. It was, there-
fore, erroneous and considering the direct conflict in the 
evidence, constituted "a miscarriage of justice" within the 
meaning of article VI, section 4% of the California Constitu-
tion. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. I cannot agree, 
however, with the doctrine set forth in the majority opinion 
that an act or a failure to act in violation of a statute like the 
Vehicle Code is merely "presumptive evidence of negligence," 
which may be rebutted by showing that the act or omission 
was justifiable or excusable under the circumstances, with the 
excuse or justification a question of fact for the jury. This 
doctrine is in effect a modified form of the doctrine that the 
violation of a statute (herein used to include an ordinance) 
is merely evidence of negligence. Under the ordinary eyidence-
of-negligence doctrine the jury, while obliged to consider the 
statutory standard, is free to substitute a standard of its own. 
Under the majority opinion it is likewise free to do so, if the 
one violating the statute offers evidence of excuse or justifica-
tion. Since it is a question of fact for the jury whether the 
excuse or justification is sufficient, the result is that one violat-
I ing the statute need only offer proof that he acted as a reason-
ably prudent person under the circumstances, and the jury is 
then free to conclude therefrom that he was justified in violat-
ing the statute unless "reasonable men can draw but one in-
ference ••. pointing unerringly to .•. negligence." 
The statement is frequently found in the cases that an act 
in violation of a statute "is presumptively an act of negligence 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.! 
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and while the defendant is permitted to rebut such presump-
tion by showing that the act was justifiable or excusable under 
the circumstances, until so rebutted it is conclusive." (Mora 
v. Fam1la, 186 Cal. 199, 202 [199 P. 17] j see, also, Berkovitz 
v. American River Gravel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 199 [215 P. 675] ; 
Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 431 [229 P. 30] ; Harris v. 
Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 58 [161 P. 1155, Ann. Cas. 1918E 560, 
L.R.A. 1917C 477]; Rath v. Bankston, 101 Cal.App. 274, 281 
{281 P.1081].} The vice of such a statement is that it leaves 
to the jury the determination of the e1rect of a statute, a 
question of law that properly belongs to the court. Presump-
tions are used in ascertaining what the facts are, not in· de~ 
termining what the law is. (See, Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed. 
§ 2490.) If the "presumption" can be rebutted merely by 
showing that one charged with violating the statute acted as 
a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances, the 
controlling standard is no longer the statutory rule, but the 
view of the jury as to what constitutes reasonable conduct. 
The vital question, presented at the outset, is whether the 
statutory standard is applicable at all. If it is, the conduct 
of the parties must be measured by that standard, and the 
jury is not free to determine what a reasonably prudent person 
would have done under the circumstances. If there is sufficient 
excuse or justification, there is ordinarily no violation of a 
statute, and the statutory standard is inapplicable. If a statute 
is 80 drawn as not to be susceptible of such a construction, 
80 that it would impose liability without fault, the statutory 
standard is ordinarily not an appropriate one in a negligence 
ease and should be rejected by the court. (Clinkscales v. 
Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 75 [136 P.2d 777] ; see Morris, Criminal 
Statutes and Tort Liability, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 453, 457.) It is 
needlessly circuitous and confusing, and productive of caprice 
and conflict in decisions, to instruct the jury that they should 
first determine whether the conduct in question fell below 
the statutory standard and that they should then determine 
whether such conduct was justifiable under the circumstances. 
It is a question of law in each ease whether the acts were in 
violation of the statute, or excepted therefrom, or if not ex-
cepted, whether liability without fault would be imposed by 
adopting the statutory standard. It is of course a question 
of fact whether the alleged acts occurred. 
A majority of American courts have adopted the doctrine 
that the violation of a statute constitutes negligence per ,. 
.. 
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towards persons harmed as a result of acts or omissions eon-
stituting such violation, if the statute was designed to protect 
such persons against that kind of harm, even though the 
statute provides criminal sanetions only and makes no refer-
ence to eivil liability. (See, James. Accident Liability, 55 
Yale L.J. 365, 367; Prosser, Torts. § 39; Thayer, Public Wrong 
and Private Action, 27 Harv.L.Rev. 317; Restatement, Torts, 
§ 286.) The courts of this state have frequently followed this 
doctrine. (Siemer, v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418, 420; Driscoll v. 
Market Street etc. By. Co., 97 Cal. 553, 565 [32 P.S91, 33 
Am.St.Rep. 2031: McKune v. Santa Clara V. M. ct L. Co., 110 
Cal. 480, 486 f42P. 9801; Benjamin v. NooMn, 207 Cal. 279, 
283 [277 P. 1045) : Crag" v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 154 Cal. 
663 f98 P. 1063, 16 Ann.Cas. 106]]: Bat7.largcOfl v. Myers, 
]80 Cal. 504, S07 f182 P. 371 : Clinkscales v. CaNJer, 22 Cal.2d 
72, 75 f136 P.2d 7771: Hopper v. Bulakh, 27 Ca1.2d 431, 434 
[164 P.2d 4831 : King v. Cit" of Long Beach, 67 Cal.App.2d 
1, 6 {IS3 P.2d 445J: Alechoff v. ~8 Angeles O. ct E. Corp., 
84 Cal.App. 33. 39 f257 P. 5691.} 
It is clear that the le¢slative standard is controlling if the 
statute expres..<dy provides for civil liability. Confnsion has 
arisen in the past from a failure to understand why the legis-
lative standard governs civil liability when the statute pre-
scribes criminal sanetions only. The reason is simply that the 
courts under common law principles make the legislative 
standard eontrolling and take the formulation of a standard 
from the jury, when they find that the eriminal statute has 
been enacted not merely in the interest of the community as a 
whole but to protect a general class of persons, of which the 
party invoking the statute is a member, against the kind of 
harm that has been sustained. The decision as to what should 
be the controlling standard is made by the court, whether it 
instructs the jury to determine what would have been due care 
of a man of ordinary prudence under the circumstances or to 
follow the standard formulated by a statute. The latter 
standard determines civilliabiJity, not because the Legislature 
has 80 provided. but because the courts recognize that, with 
rCRpeet to the conduct in question, the duties of the parties 
are determined by the statute. (The legislative standard may 
be eontrolling even in situations in which there is technically 
no crime. (Olinkscales v. Oarver,22 Ca1.2d 72. 75 [136 P.2d 
777); see, also, Polk v. City 0/ LO$ Angel", 26 Ca1.2d 519, 
. , 
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541-542 [159 P.2d 931].) If the forbidden eonduct were . 
merely evidence of negligence, the jury would be free ot sub. 
Btitute its own standard of reasonable conduct, and to approve 
conduct that the Legislature has declared 10 dangerous as to 
eatl for eriminaJ punishment. "Negligence is failure to aer-
eise the care required by law. Where a statute defines the 
standard of eare and the safeguards required to meet a recog-
nized danger, then as we have said, no other measure may be 
applied in determining whether a person has earried out the 
duty of eare imposed by law. Failure to observe the standard 
imposed by statute is negligence, as a matter of law." (Leh-
man, J. in Tedl4 v. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124 (19 N.E.2d 987, 
990].) "By the very terms of the hypothesis, to omit, will-
fully or heedlessJy, the safeguards prescribed by law for the 
benefit of another that he may be preserved in life or limb, 
is to faU short of the standard of diligence to which those who 
live in organizedsoeiety are under a duty to conform. • • . 
Jurol'B have no dispensing power, by which they may reIns 
the duty that one traveler on the highway owes under the 
statute to another. It is error to tell them that they have." 
(Cardozo, J. in Martin v. Hereog, 228 N.Y. 164 [126 N.E. 
814,815].) 
Some statutes, such as trafIlc laws, are enacted, not to pre-
vent acts that the community may regard 88 inherently 
undesirable, but to prescribe uniform and eertain· rules of 
conduct in the interest of safety. Such rules are authoritative 
declarations as to how persoDS shan act, and must be observed 
because regulations of some kind are essential. "Vehicular 
traftic can proceed safely and without recurrent traftic tangles 
only if vehicles observe accepted rules of the road. Such rules, 
and especially the rule that all vehicles proceeding in one 
direction must keep to a designated part or side of the road-
in this country the right hand side-have been dictated by 
necessity and formulated by custom. The general ue of auto-
mobiles has increased in unprecedented degree the number and 
speed of vehicles. Control of traffic becomes an increasingly 
difficult problem. Rules of the road, regulating the rights and 
duties of those who use the highways. have, in eonsequenee, 
become increasingly important. The Legislature no longer 
leaves to custom the formulation of such rules. Statutes now 
codify, define, supplement, and, where changing conditions 
suggest change in rule. even change rules which formerly: 
rested on custom." {Lehman, J., in Tedl4 v. Ellman, 280 N.Y • 
.. 
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124 [19 N.E.2d 987, 989].) In such a fleld, "when the Legisla-
ture has spoken, the standard of care required is no longer 
what the reasonably prudent man would do under the cir-
cumstances but what the Legislature has commanded." (Tedla 
v. Ellman, supra, at p. 990 [19 N.E.2d].) 
.An instructive analogy may be drawn between tra.ftl.e rules 
and navigation rules designed to prevent collisions at sea. It 
is recognized that the navigation rules rather than what the 
conduct of a person of ordinary prudence would have been 
under the circumstances furnish the standard as to whether 
a collision has been caused by negligence of a navigator (Th, 
Pennltylvania, 19 Wall. (86 U.S.) 125, 135 [22 L.Ed. 148];. 
The SlI.ffolk, 258 F. 219, 221 [169 C.C.A. 287]; BeZelen v. 
Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 702-703 [14 S.Ct. 264, 37 L.Ed 1218]), 
and that "it is necessary that the courts should rigorously 
enforce the collision rules that the object for which they were 
framed may be attained." (The 8ti/inder, 275 F. 271. 277; 
The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186. 202 [15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 9431.) 
This same reasoning should be applicable to the rules of the 
Vehicle Code, and this has been the view of the courts of this 
state, which have held that conduct in violation of the Vehicle 
Code is negligence as a matter of law. (Benjamin v. Noonan, 
207 Cal. 279, 283 [277 P. 10451 ; Hurlel v. Albert Cohn. Inc., 
5 Cal.2d 145, 147 [52 P.2d 9221 ; 14hti v. McMenamin. 204 
Cal. 415, 418 [268 P. 644]: Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 
149 Cal. 131, 139 r85 P. 152, 5 L.R.A.N.S. 1059] ; Ferguson 
v. Nakahara, 43 CaI.App.2d 43n. 443 rno P.2d 1091]; Re't16S 
v. Lapinta. 25 Cal.App.2d 680. 68] 178 P.2d 4651; 8cragg v. 
SaUee, 24 Cal.App. 133. 144 f140 P. 7061; Mcu:gedian v. 
8wift & Co., 22 Cal.App.2d 570. 572 r71 P.2d 8331 ; Duncan 
v. J. H. Corder & 8on. 18 Ca1.App.2d 77, 83 [62 P.2d 1387] ; 
see 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-Year Supp .• 226-227; 19 Cal.Jur. 632.) The 
Legislature in revisin~ the Vehicle Code from time to time 
presumably knew that the courts had established this doctrine, 
and in 1943 it expressly recognized the doctrine when it pro-
vided in section 403.5 that conduct in violation of the provi-
sions of the Vehicle Code shan not be regarded as "negligence 
per se" jf a federal regulation 8uthorize.c; such conduct. 
Extraordinary circumstances may ju,<rtify conduct that 
appears to violate the letter of a statute but which is im-
pliedly excepted therefrom. if obedience is substantially im-
possible or deviation from the letter of the statute is necessary 
. I 
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to serve its purpose. "If a criminal statute or ordinance which 
prohibits a particular act is construed to permit such an act 
to be done under conditions without criminal responsibility 
such an act may be done under the same conditions without 
creating civil liability under the statute or ordinance. Many 
statutes and ordinances are 80 worded as apparently to ex-
press a universal obligatory rule of conduct. Such enact-
ments, however, may in view of their purpose and spirit be 
properly construed as intended to apply only to ordinary 
situations and to be subject to the quali1ieation that the con· 
duct prohibited thereby is not wrongful if, because of an 
emergency or the like, the circumstances justify an apparent 
disobedience to the letter of the enactment. Thus, the statu-
tory prohibition against parking an automobile on the trav- I 
eled part of a highway is not applicable to one which h8.fl 
broken down and is incapable of motion and thus remains 
on the highway while the driver is diligently seeking assist· 
ance to remove it. The provisions of statutes, intended to 
codify and supplement the rules of conduct which are estab. 
lished by a course of judicial decision or by custom, . are often 
construed as subject to the same limitations and exceptions 
as the rules which they supersede. Thus, a statute or ordi-
nance requiring all persons to drive on the right side of the 
road may be construed as subject to an exception permitting 
travellers to drive upon the other side, if 80 doing is likely 
to prevent rather than cause the accidents which it is the pur-
pose of the statute or ordinance to prevent." (Restatement, 
Torts, § 286, comment (c); see Johnson v. GrijJith, 19 Cal.~M 
176,180 [120 P.2d 6] ; Mathers v. County of Ritlerside, 22 Cal. 
2d 781, 785 [151 P.2d 419] ; Umemoto v. McDonald, 6 Cal.2d 
587, 590 [58 P.2d 1274]; Dewhirst v. Leopold, 194 Cal. 424, 
431 [229 P. 801 ; Berkovitz v. American River GraveZ Co., 191 
Cal. 195, 199 [215 P. 675] ; Cragg v. Los Angeles Trust Co., 
154 Cal. 663, 667 r98 P. 1063, 16 Ann.Cas. 1061] ; Fietz v. 
Hubbard, 59 Cal.App.2d 124, 128 [138 P.2d 815] ; Prescott v. 
City of Orange, 56 Cal.App.2d 144, 148 [132 P.2d 523] ; Mor-
ris v. Purity Sausage Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 536, 540 [38 P.2d 
193] ; Pouch v. Werner, 99 Cal.App. 557, 564 [279 P. 183] ; 
Dugan v. Fry, 34 F.2d 723; Long v. Steffen, 194 Wis. 179 
[215 N.W. 892, 61 A.L.R. 1155]; 24 A.L.R. 1304; 63 A.L.R. 
277.) Thus "if some good excuse appears, which would be a 
sufficient defense to an action for the penalty imposed by the 
law ••• then the law is not really violated!' (Berkotlitz v • 
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American Biver GrlWeZ Co., 191 Cal. 195, 199 [215 P. 875].) 
"A classic illustration of the same general principle is the 
Bologna ordinance against blood-letting in the streets, which 
did not make criminals of surgeons." (Edgerton, J., in Boss 
v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 16; 78 App.D.C. 217; 158 A.L.R. 
1870.) A similar exception is expressly formulated in the Navi-
gation Rules as follows: "In obeying and construing these 
rules due regard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and 
collision, and to any special circumstances which may render 
a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid 
immediate danger." (33 U.S.C.A., § 212, art. 27.) "The duty 
is imperative to observe the rules, and to assume that an ap-
proaching vessel will do likewise, until after the danger has 
become so manifest as to show that there is no proper choice 
of judgment other than that of departing from the rules. 
Any other course would lead to confusion and be a most pro-
lific source of accidents." (The Piankatank, 87 F.2d 806, 810; 
1ntagliata v. Shipowner, ,tc. Co. 26 Cal.2d 865, 377 [15!l 
P.2d 1].) 
A statute regnlating traffic must be reasonably construed 
not only by limiting its e1rect to the situations envisaged when 
it was enacted, but also by reading BUch provisions in con-
junction with one another and with the rules of the common 
law supplementing them. Thus, provisions governing the right 
of way at an intersection, by their very nature, apply only 
to part of the conduct of each operator of a vehicle. The 
safety of operators who meet at an intersection depends also 
on the conduct of each of them before he reaches the critical 
juncture. An operator who approaches the intersection at 
an improper rate of speed, or suddenly increases his speed 
before he reaches the intersection, may be at fault even though 
he is first at the intersection and therefore under the letter 
of the statute entitled to cross it. (Lindenbaum v. Barbour, 
213 Cal. 277, 281 [2 P.2d 161]; 8tevefl.8on v. Fleming, 47 
Cal.App.2d 225 (117 P.2d 717] ; Groat v. WalkUp Drayage 
etc. Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 350, 355 [58 P.2d 200]; see 136 
A.L.R. 1497,89 A.L.R. 838.) Again, an operator who reaches 
the intersection first after he has properly approached it may 
be at fault if he proceeds blindly in disregard of danger that 
is obvious. (DOfI,(Jt v. !hilan, 192 Cal. 426, 429 (221 P. 193] ; 
Enz v. Jokfl.8, 112 Cal.App. I, 5 [296 P. 115] ; Blackm&re v. 
BrenMn, 43 Cal.App.2d 280, 287 [110 P.2d 723] ; see 2 Cal. 
) 
) 
. I 
600 ~ tI. OBANGE G1£NN SCHOOL DDr.r. [29 C.2d 
Jur. Ten·Year SUpp. 341.) Since the dut)' of eaeh operator 
to observe the right of way rules is imperative, one who ar-
rives at an intersection first may assume that the operator 
of another vehicle will obey the rules. (Leblanc v. ClWerdole, 
213 Cal. 654, 657 [8 P.2d 312] ; Page v. Mazeei, 213 Cal. 644, 
645 [3 P.2d 11]; Eberl v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 54 Cal. 
App.2d 497, 501 [129 P.2d 135]; Atlo.lo. v. Grlmtile, SO Cal. 
App.2d 725, 728 [87 P.2d 392]; Couchman v. Snelling, 111 
Cal.App.192,195 [295 P. 845); see 2 Cal.Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 
338.) One's right to assume that the other will obey the rules 
ceases only when the circumStances make it manifest that the 
other cannot or does not intend to obey the law; even then the ,I' 
one having the right of way is not' at fault unleas by yielding 
the right of way, stopping his vehicle, or taking other action, . 
a collision could be avoided. " 
The issues in the present case related to the approach of 
eaeh operator to the intersection and his conduct at the i 
intersection. The bUB driver testified that the bus was ap-
proximately 195 feet from the intersection when he first ob-
served plaintitl's car, which was then approximately 300 
feet from the intersection; that he was travelling at approxi. 
mately 30-35 miles per hour and that plaintitl was travelling 
at about 45 miles per hour; that he realized that the two 
vehicles would reach the intersection at approximately the 
same time if he did not change his speed but that he expected 
that the plaintitl, coming from the left, would reduce his 
speed. Plaintitl testified that he was travelling at a speed of 
approximately 25 miles per hour and 1lrst saw the bUB when 
he was approximately 75 feet from the intersection and the 
bUB was at least twice that far from the intersection. The 
bus driver was at fault if he raced for the intersection or if he 
became aware that plainti« would not give him the right of 
way and if he could have avoided the collision by yielding the 
right of way, stopping or taking other action. Plaintitl was 
at fault if he approached the intersection at improper speed 
or observed that the bus would reaeh the intersection first or 
at the same time as he wl>U1d. If the bus driver approached 
the intersection at a proper rate of speed and could not antici· 
pate that plaintitl would be there first, the issue became im-
portant whether the bUB driver perceived that there was a 
manifest danger of collision to be avoided by his yielding the 
right of way, stopping, or taking other action to avoid the 
tol1aoa. In t1Us respect his testimOIl1'. that he knew that 
i 
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a collision was inevitable when plainti«'. ear was about 40 
feet from the interaeetion, was important. It must also have 
been clear to the plainti« that the closer he came to the inter-
section the more he had to be certain that he did not have 
"worlds of time" as he allegedly thought when he first IILW 
the bus. 
The jury should have been instructed in accordance with 
the foregoing rules. 
The trial court'. instruction, qouted in the majority opinion, 
did not advise the jury that the question as to who was at 
fault was to be determined under the right-of-way provisions, 
if both cars properly approached the inte.rseetion and one 
was there first or one car came from the right, if they both 
arrived at the intersection at the same time. The instruction 
was inadequate in not advising the jury that one cannot gain 
the right of way by racing for it or otherwise violating the 
law. The efreet of the instruction was to advise the jury that 
the provisions of the Vehie1e Code dealing with the right of 
way were of.no consequence, and that if an ordinary prudent 
person under the circumstances would have fiolated the 
statute, the violation was excused. Instead of deacn'bing the 
scope of the statutory standard the court rejected that stand-
ard and in its place adopted the reasonable man standard, 
leaving it to the jury to determine what was proper conduct 
under the circumstances. 
In cases of this IOrt the choice of the wrong theory, either 
as a basis of instruction to the jury or as a rule of decision 
for the trial court sitting without a jury, may have serious 
consequences. Any doctrine that allows uncontrolled dis-
e.reti.on in the jury or trial court to disregard statutory 
standards cannot fail to bring about a aimilarc1isregard of 
the standards by those whose conduct is regulated. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. The issue in this case is whether or 
not a purported violation of the traffic law right of way at 
intersections (Veh. Code, § 550) eonstitutes negligence per .el 
that is, whether the court should adopt it as the invariable 
standard of care or the teat should be that of the conduct of a 
person of ordinary prudence. The latter is preferable for the 
reason that the rule is not capable of precise application. 
A violation of the rule mayor may not be negligence de-
pe-n.ding upon the circumstance.. That is eonceded by the 
opiDion prepa:red by Justice Edmonds and is supported by the 
. , 
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authorities. It is clear that there may be factors indicating 
that the violation of the rule may not be negligence, such 18 
excuse, emergency, justification, the speed of the vehicles, 
and their distance from the intersection and the nature of the 
intersection. (See Mather, v. Oounty of BitJerBide, 22 Cal. 
2d 781 [14:1 P.2d 419]; Lindenbaum v. Barbour, 213 Cal. 
277 [2 P.2d 161]; 8tetJBMon v. Fleming, 4:7 CaI.App.2d 225 
[117 P.2d 717]; Miller v. Crandon, 4:1 CaI.App.2d 470 [106 
P.2d 963); Groat v. Walkup Drayage etc. Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 
350 [58 P.2d 200].) Being dependent upon the circumstances 
in the particular ease, we have nothing more, in ettect, than 
an application of the ordinary prudence standard, and the 
provision of the statute should not be made an absolute stand-
ard for the determination of either the issue of negligence 
, 
'. , , 
or contributory negligence. The right of way rule does not 
lend itself to practical application. It is only in the rare"" 
theoretical situation that it can be applied. It must be suP..:i 
posed that the two vehicles are travelling at the identical speed 
and enter the intersection at precisely the same time; and 
that the view of oncoming vehicles is equal to both drivers. 
There must be no disturbing elements or sudden emergencies. 
Justice Edmonds treats the matter 18 creating a prima facie 
case of negligence and then shifts the burden of going for-
ward to the opponent to show exculpatory circumstances. 
That leads only to confusion of the jury. If there may be 
such circumstances then the test actually being used is the 
conduct of a person of ordinary prudence. Hence the jury 
should be 80 instructed thus avoiding the complication of 
shifting the burden of proceeding which must inevitably re-' 
sult in confusion. 
The majority opinion states: "The presumption created 
by proof of the failure to comply with a statute or ordinance 
relieves a defendant from the burden of proviJig that the 
plaintift failed to act 18 a reasonably prudent man. .All that 
the defendant need prove to establish contributory negligence 
Us that plaintift'a violation of the statute in question proxi-
mately caused the accident. The burden cad upon the defend-
ont wher. IUCh violation " relied upon, " therefor. more 
etm"ly "tablished thon a failure to act CIB would 0 rBGSOMbly 
pl'lU.ient man under "milar circumda1l.CBI. If there was G 
violation of tM appUcable stotute, tM burden of going for-
ward is then cast upon tM plaintiff, if the defendant" rely-
ing upon CQutf'ibvtDf'JI .egUvence. '0 Feae'" ,vidence jUl-
") 
) 
" , 
) 
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li/lIing anta:cuse lor molation. If the jury does not believe 
that the evidence is su1!icient to excuse violation, it must find 
for the defendant." (Emphasis added.) The foregoing state-
ment will not bear thoughful analysis. After stating that: 
"All that the defendant need prove to establish contributory 
. negligence is that plaintifi's violation of the statute in ques-
tion proximately caused the accident," the opinion states: 
"The burden cast upon the defendant where such violation 
is relied upon, is therefore more easlly established than a 
failure to act as would a reasonably prudent man under sim-
ilar cireumstances." Why this result obtains does not appear. 
We may assume that all available evidence relative to plain-
tUf's conduct will be o1Iered, and it is for the trier of fact to 
determine from such evidence in the light of the applicable 
statute whether such conduct was that of a reasonably pru-
dent person under similar circumstances. If it was, it cannot 
be said that plaintifi was negligent even if he did violate 
said statute. The opinion then states that if there was a vio-
lation of the applicable statute, lithe burden of going forward 
is th.n cost "pontM plaintiff . • • to present ttJidenc6 justi/1I-
ing an tll:CU86 for tJiolation.t' (Emphasis added.) If. as as-
serted in the majority opinion, the violation of a statute or 
ordinance which is a proximate cause of the accident is negli-
gence per S6, how can such violation be excused or justified' 
It clearly appears from the discussion in the majority opinion 
that it is the position of the majority that the violation of a 
statute or ordinance is not negligence per 86 unless it is a 
proximate cause of the accident. It should follow that if such 
violation is a proximate cause of the accident. it cannot be 
excused or justified so far as civil responsibility is concerned. 
That is to say, that if a defendant has violated a statute or 
ordinance, and such violation is a proximate cause of an acci-
dent, he is liable in eivil damages for 811y injury which may 
fiow therefrom. Contributory negligence will not defeat re-
eovery by plaintiff unless it contributes proximately to the 
happening of the accident. Therefore, in order to hold that 
the violation of a statute or ordinance by plaintiff constitutes 
contributory negligence, it must first be determined that such 
violation was a proximate cause of the accident. If it was 
a proximate cause of the accident, it cannot be excused or 
justified. Ho,vever, the majority opinion purports to lay down 
the rule that the violation of a statute or ordinance may be a 
.. 
) 
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proximate cause of the accident, and therefore constitutes neg-
ligence pe,. 8e, and yet may be exeused or justified. Such a 
rule can only lead to confusion worse confounded. How such 
a rule can be applied in a trial forum is difficult to under-
stand. Negligence eases are presented by the plaintiff first 
milking out a prima facie ease of negligence on the part of 
the defendant whieh was a proximate cause of the accident. 
The defendant then presents JUs defense by attempting to 
show absence of negligence on his part or contributory negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff. When the evidenee is con-
cluded the court instructs the jury that so far as the burden 
of proof is concerned, such burden is on the plaintiff to prove 
defendant's negligence and the burden is on the defendant 
to prove any contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff 
unless such contributory negligence affirmatively appears from 
the evidence presented by the plaintiff. Aecepting the theory 
advanced in the majority opinion that the violation of a stat· 
ute or ordinance is negligenee pe,. .e, and assuming that there 
was evidence of a violation of a statute or ordinanee by either 
party, the court could very simply instruct the jury that if 
they believe that either party was guilty of a violation of a 
statute or ordinance and that such violation was a proximate 
cause of the accident the violator was guilty of negligence 
pe,. .e unless such violation was excused or justified. This is, 
in effect, what the trial court did in the ease at bar except 
that it added that a person who violates a statute is not guilty 
of negligence if he acted as a reasonably prudent person, which 
is the equivalent of saying that the violation was excused or 
justified. There is no basis in such a ease for talk about the 
"burden of going forward," or that it is easier to establish 
contributory negligence by proving that plaintiff violated 
a statute than to prove that his conduct was not that of a 
reasonably prudent person, as all of the evidence has been 
already introduced and the function of the jury is to weigh 
that evidence and arrive at a conclusion based upon the law 
contained in the instruetions of the court. 
This court has recognized that eriminal statutes Bueh as 
traffic laws are not always accepted as approximate standards 
in civil actions for negligence. (Hoppe,. 1'. Bvlaich, 27 Cal. 
2d 431 [164 P.2d 483]; Olink.cale. 1'. Oartler, 22 Cal.2d 72 
[136 P.2d 777]; Mathe,., v. Oount" of Rive,.side, 22 CaJ.2d 
781 [481 P.2d 419].) In the Mathers ease, involving the traf· 
1iee law (Veh. Code, § 525) requiring that a car be driven 
! 
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as near the right hand curb as practicable, this court in hold· 
ing erroneous an instruction that the violation thereof was 
negligence as a matter of law stated (p. 786): "Under all 
of the circumstances of the case it should have been left to the 
jm'~' whether or not the position of her [plaintiff's] car with 
T'f'fprence to the white f center 1 line constituted contributory 
l1t'gligcnce. " 
It should be obvious that the moment the absolute standard, 
which makes violation of a statute or ordinance negligence 
per 8e, is relaxed. by pennitting a showing of excuse. justi. 
fication, emergency, etc.; the inevitable result is that the issue 
of negligence is determined by the trier of fact giving consid. 
eration to evidence relating to the conduct of the parties. 
While the standard provided in the statute or ordinance is 
a factor to be considered. the ultimate fact to be determined 
is whether or not the person charged with negligence or con-
tributory negligence failed to exercise that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent person would have exercised un-
der similar circumstances. Hence, the standard appJied is the 
conduct which would be expected of a reasonably prudent 
person. Experience has shown that this is the standard applied 
by juries in the general run of negligence eases. Little heed 
is given to technical and artificial l!tandards which have no 
practical application, as jurors are familiar with traffic rules 
and are more capable of applying them to the facts of a par-
ticular case than the members of this court. 
For the reasons above discusesd a violation fo the traffic 
law right of way as constituting negligence pe,.'6 is peculiarly 
inadequate to test civil liability, and the instruction in the 
ease at bar applying the test of a reasonably prudent person 
W3!'! proper. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
) 
